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THE JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
THROUGH FAIR APPOINTMENTS ACT*
AS OF FEBRUARY 21, 2007
Minnesota has chosen to select its judges through contested pop-
ular elections instead of through an appointment system or a com-
bined appointment and retention election system . . . .  If the State
has a problem with judicial impartiality, it is largely one the State
brought upon itself by continuing the practice of popularly electing
judges.1
INTRODUCTION: THE PURPOSE OF THE MODEL
The United States Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White2 and lower court decisions following it
in various states have intensified the debate over alternatives to
election, such as appointment of judges.  According to these deci-
sions,  judicial candidates may state their own personal views on
political and legal issues and to some extent personally solicit cam-
paign funds. The cases have raised concerns that judges are com-
mitting or giving the appearance of committing themselves to
outcomes and compromising their neutrality.
Virtually every state appoints some judges, whether the appoint-
ments are of interim judges who are selected to fill unexpired terms
of departing judges, initial appointments of all judges, or something
in between.  A commission-based model of appointment, in which
a commission recommends a limited number of candidates for the
executive or appointing authority to select, has been the classic ap-
pointment model for states for decades.  Yet there are many possi-
ble variables even for commission-based systems.
The Judicial Independence Through Fair Appointments Act is a
model act which provides a merit-based system for selecting a qual-
ified, independent, accountable, and diverse judiciary based on
*  Norman L. Greene, 2007.  Norman L. Greene is a member of the New York
bar practicing in New York, N.Y.  He is the author of What Makes A Good
Appointive System for the Selection of State Court Judges: The Vision of the
Symposium, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 35 (2007), and organizer of the symposium held
on April 7, 2006 at Fordham Law School referenced in that article.
1. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 792 (2002) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring).
2. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
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close study of existing systems.3  It provides the entire structure of
a judicial selection by appointment system, building on concepts in
established commission-based appointment plans and incorporat-
ing important refinements.  Although the act is designed as a stat-
ute, many states may need or wish to convert some or all of it into
a constitutional provision in order to increase the permanence of
the scheme or because a constitutional amendment is otherwise re-
quired.  Selected portions may also be enacted separately as rules
and regulations governing the process.
THE SUMMARY OF THE MODEL AND SECTION ANALYSIS
The Judicial Nominating Commission and Commissioners
The principal element of the model act is a judicial nominating
commission, which is subject to the oversight of a judicial nominat-
ing review commission.  The mandate of the judicial nominating
commission is, among other things, to seek and receive applications
from candidates; review their credentials; interview them as appro-
priate; investigate them through the due diligence process; and pro-
pose nominees for the executive to select.  The act provides
alternatives in which the commission proposes three or five indi-
viduals, depending on the preferences of the enacting state.4
Judicial nominating commissions are created for each district for
the trial courts, for each department or circuit for intermediate ap-
pellate courts, and for the highest court, a statewide commission is
created.5  A department or circuit is presumed to be the area
served by a single intermediate appellate court, which would in-
clude a number of trial courts.  The model act takes the position
that the selection process should be decentralized through a num-
ber of commissions, with local chief executives selecting judges for
local courts and with the governor selecting judges in other cases.
Decentralization helps ensure that those involved in the judicial
selection process are familiar with the area which the court serves.
Some states, however, may have a more limited pool of available
commissioners or significantly fewer judicial positions to fill than
other states and therefore may wish fewer commissions.  Alterna-
tives suggested include one judicial nominating commission for all
courts of the state or one commission for a department or circuit to
3. The definitions of judicial independence, accountability, and diversity can
themselves be the subject of lengthy discussion.
4. See infra Sec. 1.2(d).
5. See infra Sec. 2.1(a).
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nominate judges for both the mid-level appellate court and trial
courts within the department or circuit.6
Commissions consist of thirteen members, including seven law-
yers and six non-lawyers.7  This close division recognizes not only
the lawyers’ special expertise in matters involving the judiciary, but
also the non-lawyers’ stake in the system as consumers of judicial
services.  Non-lawyers may also be keen observers of the qualities
that may make someone a good judge.  Using fewer commissioners
may be acceptable without affecting the structure of the model, al-
though using fewer than nine commissioners is not advisable.  The
terms of judicial nominating commissioners are four years.8  The
model act specifies the method of appointing lawyer and non-law-
yer members of the commission.9  The model seeks to create a non-
partisan structure by requiring a balance among political parties,
with no more than a simple majority of commissioners belonging to
the same party.10  Commissioners unaligned with any party would
not affect the balance.  Since judicial selection requires certain
knowledge and abilities, judicial nominating commissioners are re-
quired to receive training in the performance of their duties and
meet certain experience requirements.11  Among other things,
commissioners are expected to attend commission meetings, with
automatic termination for poor attendance.12  Both the commis-
sioners and applicants for judicial office are governed by rules of
conduct.
The act recognizes the importance of limiting the appointing au-
thority’s actual or perceived control over the judicial nominating
commission.  Common criticisms are that some commissioners do
not exercise independent judgment, but rather respond to the di-
rections of politicians outside the commission (principally the exec-
utive) concerning who they should select as nominees.  Potential
applicants who believe that only an executive’s favorites have a
chance at appointment may choose not to apply.  This defeats the
6. See id.
7. See infra Sec. 2.1(b).
8. See infra Sec. 2.1(o).
9. See infra Sec. 2.1(f)-(g).  The judicial nominating commissioners are principally
appointed by public officials.  The public officials who appoint commissioners vary in
part depending on the type of court for which the vacancy exists.  The use of fewer
commissions pursuant to Section 2.1(a) infra or fewer commissioners would require
modifying those who are designated to select commissioners pursuant to Sections
2.1(f)-(g) infra.
10. See infra Sec. 2.1(h).
11. See infra Sec. 2.1(c)-(e).
12. See infra Sec. 2.1(p).
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goal of obtaining the best judicial candidates, harms the image of
the selection system, and lessens public support for the appointive
process.
The act therefore prohibits the appointing authority from sug-
gesting names to the commission and thus controlling or appearing
to control the commission.13  The penalty for violating the provi-
sion regarding communications between the appointing authority
and the commission is the inability of the appointing authority to
select the judge from the names proposed by the commission, with
the power going to the chief judge of the court for which the va-
cancy exists.14  Similarly, those who appoint commissioners are pre-
cluded from making such suggestions to those they appoint.15  The
model also limits the appointing authority’s selection of members
of the judicial nominating commission to one lawyer and one non-
lawyer on the grounds that the plan should not give the appear-
ance, whether based on perception or fact, of executive control.16
The executive’s principal, if not only function, should be to select
from a list of approved nominees.  Commissioners are responsible
for identifying the most qualified candidates regardless of the like-
lihood of their appointment by the appointing authority; qualifica-
tions, and not political acceptability, are determinative.17
The Selection Process
The model establishes procedures for obtaining an invitation for
interviews, conducting interviews, a due diligence stage in which
the candidate is investigated, secret ballots and absentee ballots,
and voting for and transmitting selected candidates to the ap-
pointing authority for further study and action.18
A non-exclusive list of qualifications guides commissioners in
identifying and nominating judicial candidates.19  The list shares
13. See infra Sec. 1.2(g).
14. See infra Sec. 1.2(i).
15. See infra Sec. 1.2(j)-(k).
16. See infra Sec. 2.1(f)-(g).  Because of the concerns stated above, one may argue
that the appointing authority should have no selections to the judicial nominating
commission.  The model addresses these concerns by limiting the number of selections
to the commission by the appointing authority and precluding certain communica-
tions between the appointing authority and the commission.  The model act has not
taken the additional step of barring the appointing authority from making any selec-
tions, however.  Selection of commissioners by an appointing authority may be elimi-
nated without affecting the structure of the model.
17. See infra Sec. 3.1(a)-(d),(f).
18. See infra Judicial Nominating Commission Procedures.
19. See infra Sec. 3.1(a).
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some similarities with those used in some states and models, al-
though its terminology may vary.  A refinement is a provision that
commissioners may not give undue consideration to the law school
attended by the applicant.20  This responds to concerns that some
commissions may be elitist by preferring applicants from certain
law schools.  Quality, however, is not measured exclusively by easy
devices, such as the candidate’s law school, class rank, or judicial
clerkships as a young lawyer.  These early achievements fail to
measure the whole person, and a judicial candidate should be con-
sidered on his or her full record.  In listing various qualifying crite-
ria, the model act also recognizes the significance of the applicant
having had prior judicial education.21
Diversity in the nominating process is responsive to core Ameri-
can values and essential to building public confidence in the ap-
pointive system.  The model provides that to the extent practicable,
commissioners must reflect the diversity of the jurisdiction.22  The
commission is also to exercise “due regard” for the demographic
characteristics of the district for which a judge is to be nominated
and, more specifically, diversity of nominees in the broadest
sense.23  Nor are nominees to be predominantly from one area of
practice, a problem in various jurisdictions, typically where former
public servants of one type or another have an advantage or disad-
vantage.24  Although no one segment of the profession should be
artificially excluded from the judiciary, no one aspect of the profes-
sion should serve disproportionately.  The judiciary should reflect
the broad range of experience within the legal community.
The model act does not take a position on the confidentiality of
the proceedings, except in limited instances.  For example, by im-
plication, because public hearings would be part of the reappoint-
ment process, some of the process will be open.25  In addition, the
judicial nominating commission is required to report publicly on its
work, including the demographic characteristics of the applicants.26
The model’s code of conduct also includes confidentiality provi-
20. See infra Sec. 3.1(c).
21. See infra Sec. 3.1(a)(i).
22. See infra Sec. 2.1(i).
23. See infra Sec. 2.1(i), 3.1(b) (mentioning specific factors for consideration).
24. See id.
25. See infra Sec. 5.1(c), (h) (public hearing on judge considered for reappoint-
ment; commission to prepare and make public a “detailed narrative report for each
judge seeking reappointment”).
26. See infra Sec. 4.1.
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sions.27  Where possible, however, states should consider opportu-
nities to open the selection process to encourage public
involvement and trust, where this would not unduly compromise
candid exchanges among judicial nominating commissioners, an
applicant’s need for privacy, the willingness of the public to pro-
vide pertinent information (some may do so only if confidentiality
is assured), and other competing concerns.
Judicial Terms of Office
The model act proposes a ten-year term of office for judges at all
levels.28  The recommendation of substantial terms recognizes that
attorneys may not give up careers in practice for short-term judicial
appointments; also, terms of sufficient magnitude are required to
guarantee a reasonable measure of judicial independence.  Long
terms may be perceived as tilting the plan in favor of judicial inde-
pendence as opposed to accountability for judicial performance.
States may employ other ways to achieve accountability, however,
including through various evaluative processes, court administra-
tors, and judicial conduct commissions.
The Judicial Nominating Review Commission
A judicial nominating review commission oversees the selection
process and reviews the performance of the judicial nominating
commission and its commissioners.  The review commission may
terminate or suspend commissioners for violating the rules and
provides general oversight.29  The review commission has access to
the records of the nominating commission to perform its func-
tions.30  Review of the judicial nominating commission process is
important to ensure that the commissioners comply with their leg-
islative mandate and the applicable rules and regulations.  Al-
though this element of the model act is novel, the built-in review
process is consistent with democratic practices of checks and
balances.
27. See infra Code of Conduct—Judicial Nominating Commissions and Judicial
Nominating Review Commission, Sec. 1.
28. See infra Sec. 1.3.
29. See infra Sec. 6.1.
30. See infra Sec. 6.1(c).
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Reappointment of Judges
The judicial nominating commission reviews applications of
judges seeking reappointment after expiration of their terms.31  Us-
ing a commission for reappointment differs from most current state
appointive systems, many of which rely on retention elections.
With retention elections, a judge runs “against himself or herself,”
with the only question on the ballot being whether the judge
should be retained.  Some jurisdictions, however, already rely on
commission-based reappointments.  The closest analogue is the
District of Columbia reappointment plan.  Hawaii and New York
also have commission-based reappointment systems for their high-
est appellate courts.
The New York Court of Appeals process does not adequately
protect experienced judges since the incumbent, if reported favora-
bly by the commission, is only listed with other candidates, none of
whom has an advantage over the others.  The model act presumes
that a sitting judge should have an advantage when it comes to
reappointment, and the incumbent should be reappointed if his or
her performance satisfies the commission following appropriate in-
vestigation.  Retention elections have many of the failures of elec-
tions, including the possibility of special issue campaigns against
the incumbent judge, lack of voter knowledge of judicial perform-
ance, and limited voter participation.  Therefore, the model does
not adopt that approach.
The model act directs the commission to gather extensive infor-
mation on a judge’s performance before deciding on reselection.32
In order to reach an informed decision, the model provides for a
public hearing,33 personal interview, questionnaires, solicitation of
public input, and an observation of the judge in court through
unannounced court monitoring.34  The judicial disciplinary authori-
ties are required to share information on the judge with the judicial
nominating commission.35  Judges rated “well qualified” are auto-
31. See infra Sec. 5.1.
32. See generally id.
33. See infra Sec. 5.1(c). Although the model does not discuss the public input
process in detail, all those who observe judicial conduct (jurors, court personnel, wit-
nesses, attorneys, and the like) must be provided with simple and confidential meth-
ods to report their observations.  Optimally, attorneys would be mandated reporters
of judicial conduct.  Retaliatory conduct by the judge who is the subject of the report
should be prohibited.
34. See generally infra Sec. 5.1(b)-(d).
35. See infra Sec. 5.1(g).  Various states, such as Arizona and Colorado, employ
judicial performance review or evaluation before a judge is reselected, often in the
context of retention elections.  A state may follow these or other methods of review
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matically retained, judges rated “unqualified” are not retained, and
judges rated “qualified” are retained at the discretion of the ap-
pointing authority.36  The rating is to be accompanied by a detailed
narrative report on the judge which is to be made public.37  The
public has the opportunity for further comment after the issuance
of the report so as to permit reconsideration.38  Given the impor-
tance of judicial independence, the model act specifically provides
that disagreement with a decision of the judge is not itself grounds
for refusing to recommend the judge for reappointment.39
The Alternative of Legislation Confirmation
The model act leaves the need for legislative confirmation of ju-
dicial appointments by the appointing authority to the preference
of the jurisdiction considering it.40  Whether a state chooses to re-
quire legislative confirmation may depend on local culture and
practice.  The presence or absence of such confirmation will not
disturb the integrity of the structure.  In some jurisdictions where
there is legislative ratification of appointments, the legislature
plays a minor role, although as the federal experience shows, the
potential for active legislative involvement remains.
Where a judge is reappointed by the commission following a
finding of “well qualified” or rejected by a commission following a
finding of “unqualified,” it is anticipated that the legislature will
not have a role since in neither case is an appointment “by the
appointing authority” involved.41
or evaluation so long as they provide sufficient information on judicial performance
to enable a proper and informed decision to be made on reselection.
36. See infra Sec. 5.1(h)-(k).
37. See infra Sec. 5.1(h).
38. See id.
39. See infra Sec. 5.1(e), (f).
40. See infra Sec. 7.1.
41. See id.
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THE JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE THROUGH FAIR
APPOINTMENTS ACT
SECTION 1.1. DECLARATION OF PURPOSE AND
INTENT
(a) It is the declared purpose and intent of the legislature by
passing this act to find and appoint the best qualified persons avail-
able for service on the courts of the State of ________; to insulate
the judges of the courts from political influence and pressure; to
improve the administration of justice; to enhance the prestige of
and respect for the courts by eliminating the need for political ac-
tivities by prospective or actual candidates for judicial office; and
to make the courts nonpolitical to the maximum extent possible.
(b) It is the further declared purpose and intent of the legislature
to enhance the confidence of the public in the processes by which
judges are selected in this state; to create a process open to all
qualified persons, each of whom shall consider himself or herself to
have a fair opportunity for selection; and to eliminate control and
the appearance of control of any single individual or individuals
over the judicial nomination process other than the commission
created for that purpose and such persons as may be empowered to
select the approved nominees following the commission’s report on
such nominees.
SECTION 1.2. SELECTION OF JUDGES
(a) All judges shall be appointed to vacancies from nominees
submitted by judicial nominating commissions.  Judges shall be ap-
pointed to vacancies in county-wide judgeships by [insert name of
County chief executive officer, such as county executive] and to
municipal judgeships by the mayor and in all other cases by the
governor.
(b) A vacancy in a judgeship shall occur upon a judge’s death,
resignation, retirement, or removal, upon expiration of his or her
term, or whenever an increase in the number of judges is
authorized.
(c) As soon as a vacancy occurs or is reasonably expected to oc-
cur within the next 6 months, the administrative director of the
courts shall promptly notify the chair of the appropriate judicial
nominating commission, who shall immediately convene the
commission.
(d) The judicial nominating commission shall simultaneously
submit to the appointing authority and make public a list of 3 nom-
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inees who shall be recommended for appointment by the ap-
pointing authority, with a report of the nominees’ qualifications.
In case of more than one vacancy in any such court, the list shall
contain at least 2 additional nominees for each vacancy to be filled.
ALTERNATE A.  The judicial nominating commission shall si-
multaneously submit to the appointing authority and make public a
list of 5 nominees who shall be recommended for appointment by
the appointing authority, with a report of the nominees’ qualifica-
tions.  In case of more than one vacancy in any such court, the list
shall contain at least 2 additional nominees for each vacancy to be
filled.
(e) Nominees shall be submitted by the judicial nominating com-
mission to the appointing authority, in alphabetical order, within 60
days after the receipt of such notice of vacancy, without indication
of preference by the judicial nominating commission.
(f) The appointing authority shall select from the list of nomi-
nees a person qualified to fill the vacancy.  Such selection shall be
made no fewer than 30 nor more than 60 days after the appointing
authority’s receipt of a list of nominees.  If no appointment is made
by the appointing authority within such time, the judicial nominat-
ing commission shall immediately submit the list and any reports
prepared by the commission regarding the persons on the list to the
[highest court of the State], which shall make an appointment from
the list within 30 days of receipt of the list.  Such court may conduct
such further interviews or investigations as may be required to se-
lect nominees from the list.
(g) Before submission of a list of judicial nominees to the ap-
pointing authority, the appointing authority shall not suggest or
propose, directly or indirectly, the name of a person either to the
commission as a whole or to any commissioner, with the intent to
influence the nomination process in favor of or against such person
or the selection or rejection of such person.
(h) A commissioner who receives any communication in viola-
tion of subsection (g) of this Section 1.2 shall promptly report such
communication to the chair of the commission, and the chair shall
promptly make such communication public.
(i) Violation of subsection (g) of this Section 1.2 by an ap-
pointing authority shall deprive such appointing authority of his or
her selection of a nominee for the vacancy for which the commis-
sion is meeting.  Such selection shall instead be made by the chief
judge of the court for which the vacancy exists from the list from
which the appointing authority would have otherwise selected.
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(j) Before submission of a list of judicial nominees to the ap-
pointing authority, no person who is empowered to appoint a judi-
cial nominating commissioner shall suggest or propose, directly or
indirectly, to any commissioner appointed by such person the name
of any person, with the intent to influence the nomination process
in favor of or against such person or the selection or rejection of
such person.
(k) A communication made in violation of subsection (j) of this
Section 1.2 shall preclude the recipient of the communication from
further participation in the judicial nominating commission for the
vacancy for which the commission is meeting, unless the recipient
shall promptly and fully disclose the communication to the chair of
the commission.
SECTION 1.3. TERMS OF OFFICE
(a) The term for each judge appointed to office shall be 10 years.
Terms of reappointment shall likewise each be 10 years.
(b) Terms of judges elected or appointed before the effective
date of this act shall expire at the end of the term for which they
were elected or appointed.  The reappointment of such judges shall
be governed by this act.
SECTION 2.1. JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONS
(a) In each judicial district, a judicial nominating commission
shall be created and empowered to nominate judges for the [trial]
courts for that district.  In each [appellate department or circuit], a
separate judicial nominating commission shall be created and em-
powered to nominate judges for appellate courts [for that depart-
ment or circuit].  A statewide judicial nominating commission shall
be created and empowered to nominate judges for [the Supreme
Court or otherwise named highest court of the state].
ALTERNATE A.  In each [appellate department or circuit], a
separate judicial nominating commission shall be created and em-
powered to nominate judges for appellate and trial courts [for that
department or circuit].  A statewide judicial nominating commis-
sion shall be created and empowered to nominate judges for [the
Supreme Court or otherwise named highest court of the state].
ALTERNATE B.  A statewide judicial nominating commission
shall be created and empowered to nominate judges for the courts
of this state.
(b) Each judicial nominating commission shall consist of 13
members: 7 lawyers and 6 non-lawyers.  All members shall be re-
sidents of the judicial district or circuit [or department] for which
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they serve.  Members of the statewide commission shall be re-
sidents of the state.
(c) Lawyer members of the judicial nominating commissions
shall be members of the bar of this state who from knowledge, ex-
perience or observation are familiar with the best qualifications
and characteristics of judges.  Such commissioners shall have at
least 5 years experience as former judges, government counsel, cor-
porate counsel, private practitioners or law professors.  Actual ex-
perience as trial counsel shall not be a requirement for
membership on judicial nominating commissions.
(d) Commissioners who are not members of the bar of this state
shall be familiar with the attributes that best qualify a person for
appointment as a judge, including to the extent practicable,
through regular observation or study of the courts or otherwise.
Actual participation or involvement in the court system shall not
be a prerequisite for service as a nonlawyer member of the judicial
nominating commissions.
(e) Each judicial nominating commissioner shall receive training
in the performance of his or her duties before their commencement
and no less frequently than annually thereafter.  The chair of the
commission may direct additional training as appropriate.
(f) The lawyer members of judicial nominating commissions shall
be appointed by the appointing authority, who shall have one se-
lection; the chief judge of the state, who shall have one selection;
for a judge for the highest court of the state, by the president of the
state bar, who shall have one selection; for a judge for a circuit
court [or department] or for the highest court of the state, by the
majority and minority leaders of the state legislature, each of
whom shall have one selection; for a judge for a district or circuit
court [or department], by the chief judge of the appellate court for
the circuit [or department] for which the judge is being selected,
who shall have one selection; and for a judge for a district court, by
the chief judge of the district court, the majority and minority lead-
ers of the local legislature covering the jurisdiction of the district
court, and the president of the local bar association, each of whom
shall have one selection.  [Alternate or additional selectors to be
determined based on locale, such as educational institutions, in-
cluding law schools, and not-for-profit civic and community organi-
zations, including bar associations.]
(g) The members of the commission who are not members of the
bar shall be appointed by the appointing authority, who shall have
one selection; the chief judge of the state, who shall have one selec-
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tion; for a judge for the highest court of the state or for a circuit
court [or department],  by the majority and minority leaders of the
state legislature, each of whom shall have one selection; for a judge
for a district or circuit court [or department], by the chief judge of
the appellate court for the circuit [or department] for which the
judge is being selected, who shall have one selection; and for a
judge for a district court, by the chief judge of the district  court for
which the judge is being selected, who shall have one selection,
and by the majority and minority leaders of the local legislature
covering the jurisdiction of the district court, each of whom shall
have one selection.  [Alternate or additional selectors to be deter-
mined based on locale, such as educational institutions, including
law schools, and not-for-profit civic and community organizations,
including bar associations.]
(h) No more than a simple majority of the commissioners ap-
pointed shall belong to the same political party.
(i) To the extent practicable, the commissioners shall reflect the
diversity of the jurisdiction for which the judicial nominating com-
mission shall be held, including diversity of race and ethnicity.  In
addition, the commissioners shall reflect the diversity of gender
and geography (including both urban and rural); and among com-
missioners who also are members of the bar, practice areas and
types and sizes of practice.  Persons appointing commissioners shall
confer with each other on their appointments to the commission in
an effort to enhance diversity.
(j) A person who holds elected municipal, state or federal office,
holds office in or takes an active part in the management of the
affairs of a political party, a registered lobbyist, or the immediate
families of any such persons, may not be appointed as, or, if al-
ready appointed, remain as a member of a judicial nominating
commission.
(k) No member of a judicial nominating commission shall be a
candidate for nomination or election to public office while a mem-
ber of the commission.
(l) No member of a judicial nominating commission shall be eli-
gible for nomination as a judge until 2 years after his or her com-
pletion of service on the judicial nominating commission.
(m) No more than one person from the same company, firm or
office may serve on the same judicial nominating commission.
(n) Each judicial nominating commission shall have a chair who
shall be selected by majority vote of all the members of the com-
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mission.  The term of a chair shall be 2 years unless his or her re-
maining term as a commissioner expires sooner.
(o) The term of each member of the judicial nominating commis-
sion shall be 4 years.  Four of the initially appointed commissioners
shall be appointed for 2 years, four for 3 years, and five for 4 years.
The initial term of all members shall commence on January 1,
20____.  No member of the judicial nominating commission shall
serve for more than 2 complete consecutive terms.
(p) Commissioners are expected to attend all commission meet-
ings.  Failure by a commissioner to attend at least half of commis-
sion meetings held within a 12-month period shall result in
automatic termination of the commissioner’s term, and another
member shall be promptly appointed by the person or entity which
initially appointed the terminated member.
(q) The commission shall be provided with staff to assist in the
performance of commission duties.  The chair may appoint an ex-
ecutive director of the commission.
(r) Commissioners shall not receive compensation for their ser-
vices but shall be reimbursed for their reasonable expenses in-
curred in the course of performing their duties for the commission.
SECTION 3.1. JUDICIAL NOMINEES
(a) Persons shall be recommended by judicial nominating com-
missions for appointment as judges who by their character, back-
ground, temperament, professional aptitude, experience and
commitment to equal justice under law are deemed by the commis-
sion to be qualified to fill the vacancy.  Qualifying criteria shall in-
clude the following:
(i) Recognized intellectual capacity, sound personal and profes-
sional judgment, analytical and writing ability, and knowledge of
the law and scholarship, including judicial education.
(ii) A general reputation in the community for honesty, industry,
diligence and ethical conduct.
(iii) Courtesy, civility, excellent temperament, open-mindedness,
compassion, freedom from bias, and the ability to decide issues ac-
cording to law.
(iv) A commitment to equal justice under law and personal ser-
vice to the law.
(b) The judicial nominating commission shall give due regard to
diversity in the judiciary, including to the factors set forth in sec-
tion 2.1(i) of this Act, in recommending nominees for appoint-
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ments as judges and shall seek out members of diverse
backgrounds to apply as nominees.
(c) Each judicial nominee must be a member of the bar of this
state and a graduate of an accredited law school.  The commission
shall not otherwise give consideration to the law school attended in
determining the qualifications of the nominee.
(d) Each applicant for a court vacancy shall have been admitted
to the bar for at least 10 years by the time of his or her appoint-
ment, at least 5 years of which consist of experience relevant to the
courts as a government counsel, corporate counsel, private practi-
tioner, law professor, or judge.
ALTERNATE A.  Each applicant for a trial court vacancy shall
have been admitted to the bar for at least 10 years by the time of
his or her appointment, at least 5 years of which consist of experi-
ence relevant to the courts as a government counsel, corporate
counsel, private practitioner, law professor, or judge.  Each appli-
cant to an appellate court shall have been admitted to the bar for at
least 15 years, at least 10 years of which consist of such experience.
(e) The judicial nominating commission shall not ask an appli-
cant whether he or she belongs to a political party, no applicant
may disclose this fact to the commission, and the commission may
not consider any such information that it has or receives in connec-
tion with his or her application.
(f) The judicial nominating commission may not consider the
likelihood of the applicant’s appointment by the appointing au-
thority in connection with his or her application.
(g) Judicial nominations shall be submitted by the judicial nomi-
nating commission to the appointing authority only upon concur-
rence of no fewer than 8 members of the commission.
SECTION 4.1. REPORTS
(a) The commission shall compile, maintain, and make publicly
available annually a report which shall describe the work of the
commission over the prior year, including the number of applicants
to the commission for each vacancy, the number of interviews pro-
vided to applicants by the commission, the numbers of persons rec-
ommended for nomination, and the number of vacancies filled.
The report shall also describe in general detail the demographic
characteristics of the applicants and the numbers and percentages
of applicants who are nominated in each demographic group.
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SECTION 5.1. REAPPOINTMENT PROCEDURES FOR
JUDGES
(a) A judge seeking reappointment shall notify the judicial nomi-
nating commission no fewer than 6 months before the expiration of
his or her term of his or her wish to be reappointed.
(b) The judicial nominating commission shall make public the
names of each judge being considered for reappointment and so-
licit comment on the reappointment from the public and organiza-
tions regularly involved in the evaluation of judicial candidates,
including bar associations and other civic groups.
(c) The judicial nominating commission shall hold a public hear-
ing on each judge being considered for reappointment.  The com-
mission shall advertise the hearing in a manner reasonably
calculated to inform the public of the hearing sufficiently in ad-
vance of the date, including by publication on its website and in
major newspapers, so as to maximize the likelihood of public
participation.
(d) The judicial nominating commission shall conduct a personal
interview with the judge seeking reappointment.  The commission
shall also prepare and solicit questionnaires with respect to the
judge to be completed by, among others, attorneys, judges, jurors,
litigants, probation officers, social services case workers, crime vic-
tims, court personnel, law enforcement officers, court monitors,
and others with knowledge of the judge; and a self-evaluation form
shall be completed by the judge and submitted to the commission.
The commission also shall observe the demeanor of the judge in
court through unannounced court monitoring or other appropriate
observation.
(e) The standards for determining qualifications to serve another
term shall include the same as those used to determine whether a
person shall be recommended to fill a vacancy, but with particular
reference to demonstrated judicial temperament; knowledge and
understanding of substantive, procedural and evidentiary law; im-
partiality; communication skills; preparation; attentiveness; admin-
istrative skills; punctuality; working relationships with participants
in the judicial process; and service to the profession and the public.
(f) Public or personal disagreements by the judicial nominating
commission or any commissioner with any decisions by the judge
being considered for reappointment shall not be grounds for re-
fusal to recommend reappointing the judge; however, a judge’s de-
cisions may be considered in determining whether the judge meets
the standards set forth in subsection (e) of this Section 5.1.
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(g) The judicial disciplinary commission shall make available to
the judicial nominating commission all records relating to a judge
being considered for reappointment.  Complaints or pending pro-
ceedings regarding a judge or sanctions or discipline of the judge
by a judicial disciplinary commission shall not by themselves dis-
qualify the judge for recommendation for reappointment but shall
be considered by the judicial nominating commission and may
form a basis for a decision not to recommend reappointment.  For
purposes of this section, “judicial disciplinary commission” shall
also include the office of court administration.
(h) The judicial nominating commission shall prepare and make
public a detailed narrative report for each judge seeking reappoint-
ment, including a recommendation of “qualified,” “unqualified” or
“well qualified” and the reasons for the recommendation.  The rec-
ommendation shall be effective 45 days after issuance of the narra-
tive report.  During such 45-day period, the commission shall
consider any further public comment that it shall receive on such
recommendation.
(i) Upon the receipt of material information bearing on the rec-
ommendation within such 45-day period, the commission may re-
vise or withdraw such recommendation and resume deliberations.
Information received beyond the 45-day period may be submitted
to the judicial discipline commission for further consideration.
(j) Judges rated “unqualified” may apply to the judicial nominat-
ing commission for reconsideration of their rating within 45 days of
the issuance of the rating.  Absent reconsideration by the commis-
sion and change of rating, the term of a judge rated “unqualified”
shall expire as provided by law.
(k) Judges rated “well qualified” shall be automatically reap-
pointed for an additional term.  Judges rated “qualified” may be
reappointed in the reasonable discretion of the appointing author-
ity to an additional term after the end of the 45-day period but no
later than 60 days after the issuance of the rating.  The term of a
judge rated “qualified” and not reappointed by the appointing au-
thority shall expire as provided by law.
SECTION 6.1. JUDICIAL NOMINATING REVIEW
COMMISSION
(a) The judicial nominating review commission shall review the
performance of the judicial nominating commissions and the con-
duct and performance of judicial nominating commissioners for
compliance with this act and any rule promulgated under it.  Such
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review may be conducted on the judicial nominating review com-
mission’s own initiative or upon receipt of a request to do so.
(b) The judicial nominating review commission may suspend or
terminate any judicial nominating commissioner for violation of
the terms of this act or any rule promulgated under it.  A commis-
sioner terminated under this section shall be replaced by the per-
son or entity which initially appointed him or her within 30 days of
termination.
(c) The judicial nominating review commission shall have access
to all records of the judicial nominating commissions for purposes
of performing its functions.
(d) The judicial nominating review commission shall consist of 7
members who shall be appointed as follows: (i) one by the gover-
nor, (ii) one by the chief judge, (iii) one each by the majority and
minority leaders of the legislature, and (iv) one by the president of
the state bar.
(e) The criteria for appointment of members of the judicial nom-
inating review commission shall be the same as the criteria for ap-
pointment of members of judicial nominating commissions.  Four
members of the judicial nominating review commission shall be
members of the bar of this state, and three members shall not be
members of the bar of this state.
(f) The term of each member of the judicial nominating review
commission shall be 4 years.  The terms of the initially appointed
members shall be as follows: two members for 2 years, two mem-
bers for 3 years, and three members for 4 years.  The initial term of
all members shall commence on January 1, 20____.  No member of
the judicial nominating review commission shall serve for more
than two complete consecutive terms.  A vacancy in the member-
ship of a judicial nominating review commission shall be promptly
filled by the person or entity who appointed the person whose seat
became vacant.
(g) The chair of the judicial nominating review commission shall
be elected by majority vote of the members of the judicial nominat-
ing review commission.  The term of a chair shall be 2 years.
(h) The commission shall be provided with staff to assist in the
performance of commission duties.
(i) Commissioners shall not receive compensation for their ser-
vices but shall be reimbursed for their reasonable expenses in-
curred in the course of performing their duties for the commission.
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[SECTION 7.1. SENATE CONFIRMATION
Appointments of judicial nominees and reappointment of judges
by the appointing authority shall be subject to confirmation by the
senate of this state.]
CODE OF CONDUCT—JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONS AND
JUDICIAL NOMINATING REVIEW COMMISSION
1. Confidentiality: Except as otherwise may be necessary to con-
duct due diligence of an applicant’s qualifications, each commis-
sioner shall keep confidential all information received by the
commission concerning each applicant.  The commissioners may
disclose information to other members of the commission and in-
vestigators employed on behalf of the commission for purposes of
due diligence.  Such investigators shall also be under the same obli-
gation of confidentiality.  No information bearing on the commis-
sion’s consideration of an applicant may be directly or indirectly
disclosed by any commissioner to any person other than another
commissioner or investigator for the commission.  The commission
shall refrain from disclosing the fact of an application to a current
employer of an applicant.
2. Ex Parte Communications: Except as may be required during
the conduct of due diligence investigations, and excluding commu-
nications with the chair, all communications between commission-
ers concerning applicants shall occur in the course of commission
meetings.  Commissioners may participate in telephone calls that
provide material information regarding the fitness of any applicant
for judicial office.
3. Conflict of Interest:
(a) Commissioners shall avoid self-promotion in the course of
their service and shall not seek any advantage in threatened or
pending litigation or in professional or personal relationships re-
lated to their service or membership on the commission.
(b) No commissioner or his or her immediate family may accept
a gift or anything of value from any applicant or the immediate
family members of any applicant, unless the commissioner has a
bona fide friendship with the applicant and has recused himself or
herself from participation in consideration of the applicant.
4. Political Contributions: No commissioner shall solicit other
persons to make political contributions on behalf of any candidate
for elected office.
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5. Impartiality:
(a) No commissioner shall conduct himself or herself in a man-
ner that reflects discredit upon the judicial selection process or dis-
closes partisanship or partiality in the consideration of applicants.
(b) Each commissioner shall disclose to the commission all cur-
rent or past personal and business relationships with an applicant
before the commission.
(c) No commissioner shall vote or otherwise participate in the
consideration of (i) any applicant who is or has been a business
associate or law partner of the commissioner, and (ii) any other
applicant whom the commissioner reasonably believes he or she is
incapable of considering impartially.
(d) Commissioners shall not give preferential assistance to any
applicant to the exclusion of any other applicant.
(e) After the commission certifies the names of qualified appli-
cants to the appointing authority, no commissioner shall attempt,
directly or indirectly, to influence the decision of the appointing
authority with respect to such persons.
(f) No attempt shall be made to rank applicants, to comment
publicly on, or to disclose any preference of the commission con-
cerning applicants whom the commission has certified.
6. Code of Conduct for Applicants for Judicial Office:
(a) Applicants for judicial office shall not communicate and shall
not cause or encourage other persons to communicate with any
commissioner (including the commissioner’s family members, law
partners or business associates) in support of their applications fol-
lowing their submission, except as stated in this Paragraph 6.
(b) Applicants who have been offered an interview with the
commission are permitted to invite persons with actual knowledge
of their abilities to write letters to commissioners in support of
their applications.
(c) Applicants may return telephone calls, faxes, emails or other
communications initiated by a commissioner.
7. Political Contributions to Appointing Authority  Prohibited: No
person applying for appointment as a judge shall make any politi-
cal contribution directly or indirectly to, or solicit any such contri-
bution for, any appointing authority while his or her application is
pending.
JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSION PROCEDURES
1. Staff Review: The commission is responsible for reviewing all
applications for conformity with the application procedures.  All
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applications shall be acknowledged in writing.  Applications by
persons failing to meet minimum qualifications shall be returned to
the applicant with an explanatory letter and invitation to reapply
after minimum qualifications have been satisfied.
2. Invitation for Interviews: The commission shall determine who
shall be invited to appear before the commission for an interview.
An applicant must receive at least 5 votes from the commission to
be invited for an interview.  The commission shall maintain a list of
the applicants accepted for an interview and not accepted for an
interview.  Applicants not initially invited for an interview may
subsequently be invited for an interview upon the receipt of suffi-
cient votes.  A decision to invite or not invite an applicant for an
interview may only be based upon permissible criteria set forth in
Section 3.1 of the Act.
3. Interview Procedure: Any commissioner may ask questions of
an applicant which in the commissioner’s judgment will assist in
performing his or her function.  All questions and comments to ap-
plicants shall be courteous, fair, and respectful.  No commissioner
may inquire into particular decisions that an applicant has made or
will be likely to make as a judge or concerning the merits of any
actual case, subject to Section 5.1(f) of the Act.  Applicants may be
asked questions concerning their administrative capabilities and
decisions.  Applicants may be invited for additional interviews at
the discretion of the commission.
4. Due Diligence: After an interview, the commission shall de-
cide whether to proceed with due diligence inquiries regarding
each applicant.  An applicant shall require at least 7 affirmative
votes from the commission to proceed to the due diligence stage.
There is no minimum or maximum number of applicants from
those pending who may be subject to due diligence review.  The
chair of the commission shall assign 2 or more commissioners to
undertake due diligence responsibility for a particular applicant
and to report on the results of their inquiry at the next scheduled
meeting of the commission or such further meeting as the chair
may designate.  All due diligence research shall use a form pro-
vided by the commission to ensure uniform inquiry and basis for
dissemination of due diligence information to the commission.
5. Deliberations: After completion of the due diligence process
and upon consideration of information and evidence regarding ap-
plicants obtained during due diligence or otherwise, the commis-
sion shall deliberate and discuss the relative strengths and
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weaknesses of applicants and may consider the particular needs of
courts for which actual or mandated vacancies exist.
6. Ballot:
(a) Commissioners shall vote by secret ballot.
(b) Any commissioner who the chair determines is unable for
good cause to be present in person to cast his or her votes may vote
by absentee ballot by giving, faxing or mailing his or her completed
and signed ballot form to the chair in advance of the vote, provided
that such commissioner shall have reviewed the qualifications of
the applicant, participated in deliberations concerning the appli-
cant, and obtained all relevant information concerning the appli-
cant available to other commissioners.
(c) Proxy votes are prohibited.
7. Voting for Recommendation for Nomination: Voting for rec-
ommendation for nomination shall proceed in the same manner as
voting for interview, except:
(i) No applicant shall be recommended for nomination without
receiving at least 8 affirmative votes of the commission.
(ii) If fewer than the required minimum number of applicants
are selected for recommendation for nomination, the commission
shall not transmit the names of the applicants to the appointing
authority until supplemented by additional names recommended
for nomination to a particular vacancy.
8. Transmission to Appointing Authority: The list of persons rec-
ommended for nomination for each vacancy shall be transmitted
by the commission to the appointing authority for review, inter-
view or such further investigation as the appointing authority may
undertake.  The appointing authority may undertake further back-
ground and due diligence investigation of any person recom-
mended for nomination and may require the applicant to provide
releases or further documentation in support of such investigation.
